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Abstract: Recently, the disagreement that separates hedonic from eudaimonic philosophers has 
spread to the science of wellbeing. This has resulted in two opposing perspectives regarding 
both wellbeing concepts and proposed pathways to wellbeing. Whilst contention continues, 
most contemporary psychologists now agree that hedonic and eudaimonic approaches each 
denote important aspects of wellbeing. This has led to integrated wellbeing conceptualisations, 
in which the combined presence of hedonic and eudaimonic wellbeing components is referred to 
as ‘flourishing’. In regard to the attainment of wellbeing, research simultaneously investigating 
hedonic and eudaimonic pathways suggests that a life rich in both types of pursuits is associated 
with the highest degree of wellbeing. Despite this assertion, previously underemphasised 
methodological limitations question the validity of such claims. To further progress this 
important area of investigation, future research directions to ameliorate said limitations are 
explored. It is recommended that the past tendency to contrast and compare hedonia and 
eudaimonia be abandoned, and instead that the inherent value of both be recognised. Time-use 
research methods are needed to cross-validate past findings obtained from cross-sectional 
research, which will make it possible to transition from purely descriptive conclusions to applied 
conclusions. 
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1. Introduction 
How to achieve optimal psychological wellness has always been a fundamental enquiry 
regarding human life. Despite this, psychological research over the past half century has 
focused almost exclusively on psychopathology (Seligman & Csikszentmihalyi, 2000). In more 
recent years, the emergence of positive psychology has lifted the taboo surrounding research 
into areas such as happiness and wellbeing, resulting in an abundance of research interest 
(Linley, Joseph, Harrington, & Wood, 2006). Despite much interest, multiple and sometimes 
opposing perspectives have since been postulated regarding not only the constituents of 
wellbeing, but also ways in which one can optimise one’s personal experience of wellbeing. 
Past dissent pertaining to the nature and pursuit of happiness and wellbeing resulted in the 
establishment of two opposing philosophical traditions: hedonia and eudaimonia (Grinde, 
2012). The hedonic perspective suggested that maximising one’s pleasurable moments was the 
pathway to happiness, whilst eudaimonic advocates argued that living a life of virtue, and 
actualising one’s inherent potentials was the way to wellbeing (Delle Fave, Massimini, & Bassi, 
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2011b). These philosophical traditions have since been translated to contemporary psychology 
for the development of a science of wellbeing. This translation of philosophical ideas to 
psychological constructs has not been without contention, and the usefulness or even existence 
of such a distinction has recently been debated at length (Kashdan, Biswas-Diener, & King, 
2008; Waterman, 2008). Despite contention, eminent psychologists now appear to see the 
benefits of both hedonic and eudaimonic approaches, which has resulted in the emergence of 
integrated wellbeing conceptualisations (e.g. Huppert & So, 2009), which use the term 
‘flourishing’ to describe the combined presence of both hedonic and eudaimonic wellbeing 
concepts. Such methodologies comprehensively capture both the nature of wellbeing, and the 
potential pathways to the attainment of wellbeing. Whilst research utilising integrated 
methodologies remains in its infancy, emerging from the literature is the suggestion that a life 
rich in both hedonic and eudaimonic pursuits is associated with the greatest degree of 
wellbeing (Huta & Ryan, 2010).  
This article reviews the philosophical origins of the two traditions and delineates the 
various perspectives held by contemporary psychologists. Possible conclusions and 
recommendations are made, namely for the continued pursuit of both hedonic and eudaimonic 
approaches with an emphasis on integration rather than comparison. Research investigating 
eudaimonia and hedonia in parallel terms is then critically reviewed as such studies reflect a 
vital attempt to abandon dichotomous thinking, which makes it possible to observe the 
interrelationship between hedonia and eudaimonia. The implications and limitations of the 
reviewed studies are discussed, and future research directions aimed at ameliorating past 
methodological limitations are proposed to further progress this important research focus.  
 
2. Background 
2.1 Two philosophical traditions 
Underlying this contemporary psychological debate are two ancient Greek philosophical 
traditions: hedonia and eudaimonia (Delle Fave et al., 2011b). A detailed review of these 
philosophical underpinnings is beyond the scope of this paper; however, a brief review is 
necessary to lay the foundations for this contemporary discussion. The hedonic tradition can be 
traced back to philosophers such as Aristippus, Epicurus, Bentham, Locke, and Hobbes 
(Waterman, 2008). Philosophers adopting the hedonic perspective generally equated wellbeing 
with the positive emotional states that accompany satisfaction of desire; therefore experiences 
of pleasure, carefreeness, and enjoyment were considered reflective of wellbeing (Diener, 2009). 
Hedonic philosophers believed that humans essentially desire to maximise their experience of 
pleasure and to minimise pain; pleasure and pain were seen as powerful indicators of good and 
bad and hence maximising pleasure was seen as a way of maximising the good in one’s life. 
Hedonic philosophers traditionally took a ‘subjectivist’ position, in that the individual is 
considered to be in the best position to determine how well they are.  
The eudaimonic tradition is often contrasted with, and considered philosophically opposed 
to, the hedonic tradition (Deci & Ryan, 2008). The concept of eudaimonia was first explicated 
by Aristotle (Aristotle, 1985); however, it has also been linked to other ancient philosophers 
such as Plato and Zeno of Citium (Grinde, 2012). Aristotle proclaimed that living a life of 
contemplation and virtue, in accordance with one’s inherent nature (i.e. living authentically, or 
in truth to one’s ‘daimon’) was the pathway to wellbeing (Norton, 1976). Aristotle defined 
acting virtuously as behaving in a way that is noble and is worthwhile for its own sake; often 
emphasising the virtues of justice, kindness, courage, and honesty. Aristotle further suggested 
that developing one’s potentials in the pursuit of complex and meaningful (both to the 
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individual and society) goals was the hallmark of a good life (Keyes & Annas, 2009). He 
distinguished between pleasure and the good life, at times denigrating hedonism as a vulgar 
ideal, as he believed it made humans the slaves of desires. Positive emotional experiences were 
not central to Aristotle’s conception of a good life, though he did acknowledge that often the 
result of eudaimonic action was hedonic pleasure (Kashdan et al., 2008). Aristotle did not 
denigrate hedonic pleasure per se, but rather, the pursuit of hedonic pleasure purely for 
pleasure’s sake (Waterman, 2008). Aristotle’s conception of eudaimonia has predominantly 
been considered an objective approach, where a life is judged from the outside, according to 
whether it was a life of excellence and virtue (McDowell, 1980). This approach represents a 
concern that hedonic happiness and satisfaction can result from reprehensible behaviour, and 
therefore subjective reports of happiness should not be considered a good indication of 
whether a life is well lived. As subjective pleasure can be experienced in many contexts (e.g. 
through the use of illicit drugs), positive subjective reports may not always be reflective of 
wellness.1 This would suggest that eudaimonic philosophers are more concerned with why 
someone is happy, rather than if someone is happy. 
 
2.2 From philosophy to science  
Philosophers and psychologists often inspire each other’s work, which has led to the attempted 
adaptation of the aforementioned philosophical approaches to the psychology of wellbeing 
(Kahneman, Diener, & Schwarz, 1999; Waterman, 1993). Hedonic psychological approaches 
have generally considered wellbeing an internal state which represents a variety of subjective 
evaluations about the quality of one’s life, broadly defined (Delle Fave et al., 2011b). This 
conception generally translates to the construct of subjective wellbeing (SWB), which has 
typically been considered to include an affective component, consisting of a preponderance of 
positive emotional experiences over negative emotional experiences, and a cognitive 
component, which refers to a personal judgment on the satisfaction one has with life as a 
whole, or with specific life domains, such as work or relationships (Diener, 2009). At the 
activity or pathway level (i.e. wellbeing-promoting behaviours), hedonic approaches have 
typically emphasised the importance of engaging in pursuits that afford positive emotional 
experiences (such as pleasure, comfort, entertainment, and enjoyment) and that lead to the 
satisfaction of one’s desires (Fredrickson, 2001; Kahneman, 1999). An accumulative effect is 
assumed, whereby high degrees of wellbeing are experienced by satisfying one’s personal 
desires and increasing the frequency of one’s pleasurable moments (Fredrickson, 2004). 
Whilst there has been general consensus amongst hedonic psychologists about wellbeing 
indicators and pathways, there has been more ambiguity surrounding the translation of 
eudaimonia to psychology (Kashdan et al., 2008). This has led to the emergence of a variety of 
theories and approaches, with personal growth and meaning in life often emphasised as core 
eudaimonic components (Delle Fave et al., 2011b). Other constructs that have also been linked 
to the eudaimonic perspective include purpose, autonomy, competence, self-realization, 
mindfulness, self-acceptance, authenticity, values congruence, and social connectedness 
(Baumeister & Vohs, 2002; Huta & Ryan, 2010; Ryan & Deci, 2000). What becomes immediately 
apparent is that eudaimonia seems a more complex and elusive concept than hedonia. 
Eudaimonic approaches also emphasise that wellbeing and happiness are on-going processes, 
not end states. Despite this, like hedonia, eudaimonia has been considered at both the 
wellbeing and activity levels, with activities that are intrinsically motivated and afford 
                                               
1 For a detailed review of the difficulties with both subjective and objective measures see Tiberius and Hall (2010). 
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development in oneself often emphasised as pathways to wellbeing (Huta, 2012). Hedonia and 
eudaimonia have, therefore, both been considered as ways of living/behaving, and more 
globally, as wellbeing types.  
 
2.3 Recent debate 
As previously alluded to, this translation of philosophical ideas to psychological constructs has 
not been without contention (Ryan & Deci, 2001). The costs and benefits of adopting these 
philosophical ideas within the science of wellbeing have recently been debated at length by 
many of the leading researchers in the field. Although the goal of this article is not to add 
further commentary to this debate, it is necessary for the authors to summarise the main points 
in order to delineate their position. Kashdan et al., (2008) began the conversation by suggesting 
that the philosophical distinction between hedonia and eudaimonia was unhelpful, 
unwarranted empirically, and potentially harmful. They levelled their argument primarily at 
the lack of scientific rigour which they believed has characterised eudaimonic approaches. 
They argued that the heterogeneity of proposed eudaimonic definitions and theories added an 
unnecessary layer of complexity, which interfered with scientific advancement. Kashdan et al. 
stated that Aristotle’s conception of eudaimonia was inappropriate for psychological science as 
it had inherent moral judgments, and was elitist, as it implied that eudaimonia was a state 
reserved for/achievable by only a select few (i.e. those with unique potentials). They further 
suggested that there was an implicit (and sometimes explicit) erroneous assumption that 
eudaimonic wellbeing was more objective, comprehensive, and morally valid than SWB. 
Kashdan et al. also expressed particular concern with the suggestion that eudaimonia was 
distinct from hedonia, and suggested that findings from research (see Waterman, 1993) 
proposed as evidence that hedonia and eudaimonia were quantitatively distinct, could easily 
be interpreted as evidence that they are part of the same construct. They argued that as hedonic 
and eudaimonic measures were often found to share a high degree of variance, results should 
be interpreted as evidence that there are quantitative distinctions among a matrix of wellbeing 
dimensions, as opposed to two qualitatively different kinds of happiness and wellbeing. 
Kashdan et al. argued for the abandonment of a hedonic and eudaimonic categorical 
dichotomy, and recommended instead that explicit reference be made to whatever construct is 
under investigation (e.g. meaning in life), rather than a general reference to the philosophical 
tradition that the construct might be aligned with (e.g. eudaimonia).  
Waterman (2008) was first to respond, arguing that it was premature to consider 
abandoning eudaimonic approaches on the grounds of a lack of conceptual clarity. Waterman 
highlighted that it was unsurprising that hedonic approaches enjoyed more scientific 
consensus, as they had been investigated for decades longer, and have a disproportionately 
larger body of research compared to eudaimonic approaches. Waterman (2008) argued that 
having a variety of definitions was appropriate during early stages, and that those operational 
definitions that emerge which correspond adequately to conceptual meanings would be the 
ones that survive. Waterman further suggested that a purely empirically-driven approach 
ignored the complexities of the wellbeing construct. Ryan and Huta (2009) agreed, suggesting 
that scientific rigour did not mean an absence of theory. They interpreted the current diversity 
within the wellbeing research focus as positive, and described the recent tension between 
hedonic and eudaimonic advocates as a generative, creative tension.  
In response to Kashdan et al.’s (2008) concern with Aristotle’s conception of eudaimonia, 
Waterman (2008) argued that contemporary psychological approaches needed to consider 
contemporary eudaimonic philosophy, and that whilst Aristotle may have adopted an objective 
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approach, current eudaimonic philosophers proposed that eudaimonia can be investigated as a 
subjective experience (see Tiberius & Hall, 2010). Waterman’s conceptualisation of eudaimonia 
emphasises the importance of developing one’s potentials, and living in accordance with one’s 
daimon (i.e. one’s true self), and therefore, Waterman has generally investigated eudaimonia at 
the activity level. Other conceptualisations have emphasised the quality of one’s life as a whole 
(i.e. eudaimonic wellbeing); where hedonic wellbeing has emphasised the importance of feeling 
good, eudaimonic wellbeing has often been defined in terms of functioning well (Keyes & 
Annas, 2009; Ryan & Huta, 2009). Ryan and Huta expressed concern that if SWB were to be the 
only indicator of wellness, then more happiness would equate to more wellness, which ignores 
both the source of happiness and the functioning of the individual. Ryan and Huta admitted 
that SWB can be a good indicator of wellness, but only when considered in the context of the 
functions, values, and behaviours that engender it, which is to say, when it is considered in 
conjunction with eudaimonia. Keyes and Annas (2009) agreed that functioning was an 
important consideration, and whilst they admitted that feelings and functioning in life would 
often be consistent (i.e. overlapping), they cited evidence suggesting that they are not 
redundant, conceptually or empirically2 (Keyes, 2006; Keyes et al., 2008). Delle Fave and Bassi 
(2009) added another element to this argument, suggesting that at times an individual may be 
healthy and functioning well, despite not feeling good in their life. One example they provided 
was when an individual is grieving the loss of someone, whereby a decrease in SWB would be 
considered part of an entirely healthy process. Furthermore, periods of uncertainty and 
adjustment are often associated with meaning-making and personal growth yet can also be 
associated with decreased SWB (Vittersø & Søholt, 2011). These examples question whether 
SWB alone is an adequate indicator of wellbeing, and suggest that eudaimonic approaches 
represent an important adjunct to SWB. 
Kashdan et al.’s (2008) suggestion that hedonia and eudaimonia are not distinct was also 
opposed by Waterman (2008). Waterman drew from his own research (Waterman, 1993; 
Waterman, Schwartz, & Conti, 2008), which found that whilst eudaimonic activities were 
highly associated with hedonic enjoyment, hedonic enjoyment was often found to arise in the 
absence of eudaimonia, and therefore they are distinct3. Whilst Waterman focused on the 
distinction between hedonia and eudaimonia at the activity level, Keyes and Annas (2009) 
argued that hedonia and eudaimonia are distinct at the wellbeing level. They referred to 
Keyes’s Complete Mental Health Model as evidence; specifically, the comparison between 
individuals who have both high degrees of SWB and of eudaimonic wellbeing (i.e. those 
considered to be ‚flourishing‛, which constituted 18% of the sample) and those that have only 
high degrees of SWB (i.e. those considered to be moderately mentally healthy, which 
constituted 48.5% of the sample). These two groups were found to differ in meaningful ways; 
flourishing individuals experienced less impairment and were less of a burden on society than 
moderately mentally healthy individuals as measured by greater work productivity, decreased 
disability, decreased risk of cardiovascular disease, decreased rates of physical illness, 
decreased healthcare utilisation and superior psychosocial functioning. These meaningful 
differences supply direct support for the utility of the eudaimonic and hedonic distinction. 
Keyes and Annas concluded that not enough people are functioning well in a life about which 
they feel good, which provides a strong rationale for both the distinction between hedonia and 
                                               
2 This research is discussed in more detail later in the article 
3 This study is reviewed at length later in this article 
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eudaimonia, and for the development of empirically validated interventions aimed at 
increasing eudaimonia to promote flourishing.   
In response to Kashdan et al.’s (2008) concern about the potential elitism inherent in 
eudaimonic approaches, Waterman (2008) suggested that this argument again reflected a 
misunderstanding of contemporary eudaimonic philosophers. Contemporary approaches de-
emphasise strivings for some particular excellent outcome, and instead emphasise the need to 
consider the individual, and the individual’s unique potentials. Therefore, if a person is 
developing within themselves, and in accordance with their own unique potentials, they are 
considered to be experiencing eudaimonia. As such, everyone has the capacity to experience 
eudaimonia, not just a select few. Waterman proposed that Kashdan et al.’s concerns about 
eudaimonia being considered more morally valid than SWB was a moot point from a scientific 
perspective, as what is ‚better‛ is a deontological claim, and therefore beyond the scope of 
scientific inquiry.  
It is clear from this brief review that there remains contention around the translation of 
philosophical perspectives to the science of wellbeing, and that this healthy debate is likely to 
continue. Despite this, it is possible to postulate some conclusions. Firstly, contemporary 
psychological approaches have clear and explicit links to the philosophical conceptions of 
hedonia and eudaimonia, and therefore we see no problem with the continued use of this 
terminology. Secondly, it is apparent that there is a distinction between hedonia and 
eudaimonia, and a meaningful one at that. Although both hedonic and eudaimonic pursuits 
may be highly related (i.e. an activity may be experienced as hedonic and eudaimonic), an 
activity can be experienced as hedonic in the absence of eudaimonia, and therefore they are 
distinct. Furthermore, at the wellbeing level, a distinction between feelings about one’s life and 
functioning seems vitally important to a comprehensive understanding of the mental health 
continuum. Thirdly, whilst eudaimonic advocates argue that SWB is not an adequate indicator 
of wellbeing by itself, they do still value SWB and hedonic approaches and consider them 
important dimensions of the overall wellbeing picture. This is an important point as it 
illustrates that despite past disagreement, contemporary psychologists recognise the strengths 
and value of both traditions. Lastly, eudaimonic approaches are still very much in their 
developmental stages; however, they contribute meaningfully and importantly to a 
comprehensive understanding of wellbeing. Despite this, eventually eudaimonic researchers 
will need to either come to a consensus, or better delineate the different perspectives into 
meaningful theories.  
 
2.4 Flourishing 
It is the common ground amongst the various aforementioned perspectives that appears most 
appealing and constructive. All agree that there is a need to continue to investigate a broad 
array of wellbeing and happiness sources and outcomes, from both the hedonic and 
eudaimonic traditions, and that this type of cross-fertilisation will increase our overall 
understanding of happiness and wellbeing. All agree that eudaimonia and hedonia should not 
be treated categorically, nor considered mutually exclusive, but rather that hedonia and 
eudaimonia operate in tandem, in a synergistic fashion. Therefore, there should be flexibility in 
studying interrelationships among the constructs. All agree that there is as much worth in 
studying the complementarity of hedonic and eudaimonic models as in studying difference. 
Finally, there is general consensus that a state characterised by both hedonic and eudaimonic 
sources and outcomes is most desirable. It is for these reasons that we now turn our attention 
towards integrated wellbeing conceptualisations.  
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Various researchers have recently aimed to combine the two conceptualisations as a means 
of more comprehensively capturing wellbeing; the assumption being that both hedonia and 
eudaimonia denote important components of an overarching wellbeing construct. Seligman, 
Parks and Steen (2004) were first to propose an integrated wellbeing theory termed Authentic 
Happiness theory, which suggested that the presence of positive emotion, meaning, and 
engagement were indicative of wellbeing. The dimensions of pleasure and of meaning in 
Seligman et al.’s model have been equated with hedonia and eudaimonia respectively. The 
dimension of engagement has been equated with flow, which is a state characterised by intense 
absorption in one’s activities, where a person’s skill and the challenge of an activity are well 
matched, and both are high (Csikszentmihalyi, 1997). As flow is often induced by activities that 
afford personal growth, a theoretical link has been proposed between flow and eudaimonia 
(Waterman, 1993). Despite this, an individual can experience flow whilst engaged in less 
virtuous and meaningful activities (e.g. flow is commonly experienced whilst playing video 
games, see Hsu & Lu, 2004), and therefore engagement should be considered distinct from, but 
related to, eudaimonia. More recently, Seligman added the facets of achievement and 
relationships to his definition, and labelled the combined presence of all components 
‘flourishing’ (Seligman, 2011). Seligman proposes that his new theory reconciles the differing 
perspectives regarding the conceptualisation and measurement of wellbeing by including both 
hedonic and eudaimonic aspects (Forgeard, Jayawickreme, Kern, & Seligman, 2011). Although 
there is currently a lack of empirical support, Seligman claims he is in the process of developing 
measures to investigate the validity of his flourishing theory of wellbeing (Forgeard et al., 
2011). Keyes (2007) proposed a similar model of wellbeing, which suggests that flourishing 
includes ‚symptoms‛ of both hedonia and eudaimonia. Keyes’s Complete Mental Health 
Model includes the facets of emotional wellbeing (i.e. SWB) and positive functioning in life (i.e. 
eudaimonic wellbeing), which includes psychological wellbeing and social wellbeing. 
‘Flourishing’ is now often used (as it will be for the remainder of this article) to describe the 
desirable state whereby both hedonic and eudaimonic facets of wellbeing are simultaneously 
present within an individual (Huppert & So, 2009).  
 
2.5. Pathways to wellbeing 
Much of the research investigating pathways to wellbeing has subscribed to either the hedonic 
or the eudaimonic perspective, utilising a unilateral approach and studying that pathway in 
isolation (Delle Fave, Brdar, Freire, Vella-Brodrick, & Wissing, 2011). Findings from such 
research have supported the effectiveness of both hedonic (e.g. Fredrickson, 2004) and 
eudaimonic (e.g. Steger, Kashdan, & Oishi, 2008) pathways; however, it is noteworthy that in 
such research wellbeing has typically been conceptualised consistently with the philosophical 
perspective of the researcher. That is, an advocate of a eudaimonic approach investigating 
eudaimonic pathways to eudaimonic wellbeing (e.g. Waterman et al., 2003), or an advocate of a 
hedonic approach investigating hedonic pathways to hedonic wellbeing (e.g. Fredrickson, 
2000). This unilateral approach has been increasingly criticised (see Biswas-Diener, Kashdan, & 
King, 2009), as conclusions cannot be made in regard to the relative effect of hedonic pathways 
on eudaimonic wellbeing or eudaimonic pathways on hedonic wellbeing. It is now 
acknowledged that hedonia and eudaimonia are not mutually exclusive (Waterman et al., 
2008), and that eudaimonic pursuits can have positive influences on hedonic wellbeing, and 
vice versa (e.g. King, Hicks, Krull, & Del Gaiso, 2006). This recognition has led to more recent 
attempts to simultaneously investigate eudaimonic and hedonic pathways, which is where we 
now turn our attention. 
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3. Integrated methodologies: A critical review  
This section will review and critically analyse research pertaining to hedonia and eudaimonia. 
Whilst not a systematic review per se, the authors considered only those studies that assessed 
eudaimonia and hedonia in parallel terms. This inclusion criterion was applied because such 
studies reflect an attempt to integrate the investigation of the hedonic and eudaimonic 
perspectives, which represents an emerging and important research direction. Studies utilising 
such methodologies have been either conceptual in focus, or have been more concerned with 
how hedonic and eudaimonic pursuits influence overall wellbeing (i.e. pathways to wellbeing). 
Conceptual research has attempted to add clarity to the constructs of hedonia and eudaimonia 
so as to better understand, define and operationalize them. Pathways research has attempted to 
answer questions pertaining to how personal wellbeing is achieved through the engagement in 
hedonic and eudaimonic activities. This section will delineate these two research foci. 
 
3.1 Conceptual focus 
The first instance of the simultaneous investigation of hedonia and eudaimonia can be traced to 
Waterman (1993). Waterman investigated hedonia and eudaimonia as subjective states 
experienced whilst engaged in certain activities. His aim was to ascertain whether hedonia and 
eudaimonia were distinct experiences. He developed the Personally Expressive Activities 
Questionnaire (PEAQ), which required participants to select five activities of importance which 
they would use to communicate who they are and what they are like as a person. Participants 
were then required to rate, on 7-point scales, how much they typically experienced eudaimonia 
(e.g. ‚this activity gives me my strongest feeling that this is who I really am‛, ‚when I engage 
in this activity I feel more intensely involved than I do in most other activities‛, etc.) and 
hedonia (‚this activity gives me my strongest sense of enjoyment‛, ‚this activity gives me my 
greatest pleasure‛) whilst engaged in their selected activities.  
Consistent with Waterman’s (1993) hypotheses, experiences of eudaimonia and hedonia 
were found to be highly related (correlations ranged from 0.71 to 0.86); however this 
relationship was found to be asymmetrical: activities that were experienced as eudaimonic but 
not hedonic were reported significantly less than activities that were experienced as hedonic 
but not eudaimonic. Both eudaimonic and hedonic activities were accompanied by positive 
cognitive-affective states to a comparable degree. However, eudaimonic activities were found 
to be strongly associated with opportunities to develop one’s best potentials, investing a great 
deal of effort, having clear goals, feeling assertive, feeling challenged, having a high level of 
concentration, and knowing how well one was doing, whereas hedonic activities were strongly 
associated with feeling relaxed, excited, content, happy, losing track of time, and forgetting 
one's personal problems. From these findings Waterman concluded that a distinction could 
reliably be drawn between the subjective states of eudaimonia and hedonia, the most important 
of which was that eudaimonia afforded opportunities for an individual to advance their 
personal potentials, whether in terms of skills and talents, purposes in living, or both.  
Waterman and colleagues (Waterman et al., 2008) have since replicated this study, with 
slight methodological adjustments. Waterman et al. believed that prior conceptions of intrinsic 
motivation (i.e. activities that are enjoyed in-and-of-themselves) were inadequate, and argued 
that intrinsic motivation should be reserved for those activities that give rise to the 
development of one’s potential (i.e. eudaimonic activities). They proposed that activities where 
just hedonic enjoyment was experienced should be considered hedonically motivated, whilst 
activities where both hedonia and eudaimonia were experienced represented true intrinsically 
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motivated activities. Again the PEAQ was used; however, two subjective conditions previously 
proposed as defining characteristics of intrinsic motivation were added: interest (Deci & Ryan, 
1985) and the characteristics of flow (i.e. having clear goals, not feeling self-conscious, being in 
control, losing track of time, knowing you are doing well, intense concentration, forgetting 
personal problems, and being fully involved) as specified by Csikszentmihalyi (1991). A further 
four variables, previously suggested as distinguishing intrinsically motivated activities from 
others were also included: self-determination (Ryan, 1992), the balance of challenges and skills 
(Csikszentmihalyi, 1988), self-realisation values (Waterman, 1990), and the level of effort 
invested in the performance of the activity (Waterman, 2005).  
Findings were consistent with Waterman’s (1993) previous study, in that the subjective 
experiences of hedonia and eudaimonia were highly correlated (>0.80), and an asymmetrical 
relationship was observed. When specifically comparing intrinsically motivated activities (i.e. 
those experienced as highly eudaimonic and hedonic) and hedonically motivated activities (i.e. 
those experienced as highly hedonic only), the former were found to be associated with higher 
scores on all four variables linked to self-realisation (i.e. balance of challenges and skills, self-
realisation values, level of effort, and importance) and were rated as higher on both interest 
and flow experiences. However, no difference was found for self-determination or frequency. 
Despite not distinguishing intrinsically motivated activities from hedonically motivated 
activities, self-determination was found to be the strongest independent predictor of both types 
of subjective experiences (i.e. hedonic and eudaimonic). Therefore, Waterman concluded that 
self-determination is a necessary, but not sufficient condition for intrinsic motivation, which 
runs counter to previous theories (see Ryan, 1992). Waterman argued that as both hedonically 
motivated and intrinsically motivated activities are enjoyed in-and-of-themselves, it is not 
surprising that they did not differ in regard to self-determination (i.e. both are freely chosen). 
These findings extend on Waterman’s (1993) early research by establishing differences between 
hedonia and eudaimonia specifically on a series of variables with documented relevance to 
intrinsic motivation. He argued that intrinsically motivated activities will be the more ‚durable 
and rewarding‛ pursuits (i.e. eudaimonic activities are better than hedonic activities).   
Taken together, Waterman’s findings suggest that hedonia and eudaimonia are highly 
related yet distinct subjective states, which are accompanied by predictable patterns of 
associated experiences. Eudaimonic activities are characterised by a balance of challenge and 
skill, the investment of a high degree of effort, the experience of interest and flow, and are 
associated with opportunities to advance one’s personal potentials. By comparison, hedonic 
activities are associated with feeling relaxed, excited, content, happy, losing track of time, and 
forgetting one's personal problems. In line with proclamations from eudaimonic philosophy 
(see Telfer, 1980), Waterman interpreted the asymmetrical relationship observed between 
hedonia and eudaimonia as evidence that there are three, not four, conceivable categories of 
activities: (1) those that are experienced as both hedonic and eudaimonic (2) those that are 
experienced as hedonic but not eudaimonic, and (3) those that are experienced as neither 
hedonic nor eudaimonic. Eudaimonic activities that were experienced as low in hedonia were 
argued therefore to be a ‚theoretical and empirical null‛. Whilst both hedonia and eudaimonia 
are positive subjective states, Waterman proposed that eudaimonia is preferable, as it affords 
opportunities for an individual to develop their potentials and is invariably accompanied by 
hedonia anyway.  
Whilst Waterman’s research represents an invaluable theory-driven investigation into the 
subjective states of hedonia and eudaimonia, some limitations need to be highlighted. Firstly, 
as Waterman investigated hedonia and eudaimonia at the activity level, conclusions regarding 
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the implications of engaging in hedonic and/or eudaimonic activities at a more global level are 
indiscernible and, as such, should not have been postulated. Despite this, Waterman concluded 
that eudaimonic pursuits are more ‚durable and rewarding‛ than others. It is entirely probable 
that the context in which the hedonic or eudaimonic activity is engaged in will highly influence 
whether it is ‚durable and rewarding‛. For example, an individual who has a day job which 
they experience primarily as eudaimonic might find it more rewarding to engage in more 
hedonic pursuits whilst not at work and these activities may constitute an important source of 
revitalisation and emotional regulation. Therefore, we believe that proclaiming eudaimonic 
activities as more rewarding is misleading and untenable from Waterman’s findings. Many 
potential problems with the PEAQ represent further limitations of Waterman’s research. 
Firstly, many individuals may find it difficult, or even inappropriate, to define themselves by 
their activities; perhaps preferring to define themselves by their values or beliefs. Secondly, the 
PEAQ may be susceptible to social desirability bias, as participants, to describe who they are, 
may choose activities which they perceive as socially favoured, despite these not accurately 
reflecting how they spend their time. This limitation is especially pertinent to Waterman’s 
research as much of the data was collected in a group setting. Lastly, the PEAQ may be 
susceptible to recall error, as participants are required to retrospectively consider what their 
typical experience of each activity is, rather than reflecting on a specific instance of engaging in 
that activity. It has been found that asking people to describe past events may lead to biased 
recollections that fit with a person’s life narrative but may be inconsistent with the frequency, 
intensity, stability, and value of moment-to-moment experiences (Kashdan et al., 2008). 
Furthermore, reporting about one’s typical experience of an activity disregards all contextual 
factors that may influence each specific experience of an activity (i.e. it ignores the likelihood 
that an individual’s experience of an activity may differ each time they engage in it, despite it 
being the same activity).  
Furthermore, Waterman et al.’s (2008) interpretation of the asymmetrical relationship as 
evidence that eudaimonic but not hedonic activities represent a theoretical and empirical null is 
questionable. When grouping activities as high and low in eudaimonia and hedonia, Waterman 
et al. used an a priori cut score equivalent to an average item response of 6 on the 7 point scales, 
which they lauded as a ‚very stringent criterion for considering an activity to be high‛ (p. 58). 
Indeed this constitutes a stringent criterion for an activity to be considered high; however, it 
simultaneously constitutes an extremely lax criterion for an activity to be considered low (i.e. 
any score below an average of 6 was considered low). If a stringent criterion was decided upon 
for considering an activity high, then you would expect an equally stringent criterion for 
considering an activity low (e.g. an average score of 2 or less). The utilised cut scores lack 
intuitive appeal and the rationale for such a decision was not explained. Perhaps the category 
of activities experienced as eudaimonic and not hedonic represents a less likely category of 
activities; however, it seems extreme and premature to label this category of activities a 
‚theoretical and empirical null‛.  
Counter to Waterman et al.’s (2008) proposition that eudaimonic pursuits are always 
accompanied by hedonic pleasure is recent research by Vittersø and Søholt (2011). Vitttersø and 
colleagues have published a number of papers delineating the differences between eudaimonia 
and hedonia (e.g. Vittersø, 2003; Vittersø, Oelmann, & Wang, 2009; Vittersø, Søholt, Hetland, 
Thoresen, & Røysamb, 2010), and although space does not permit an in-depth review of each, 
one of Vittersø’s most recent investigations will be discussed. Vittersø proposed that the 
subjective states of hedonia and eudaimonia serve distinct functions, with eudaimonia (which 
he operationalizes as feelings of interest and engagement) considered important whilst 
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pursuing complex goals and when conducting challenging activities, and hedonia (which he 
operationalizes as feelings of pleasure and satisfaction) considered important for the 
preservation of stability and for rewarding need fulfilment. Like Waterman et al., Vittersø 
acknowledges that hedonia and eudaimonia will often be highly correlated (e.g. someone may 
be pleasantly engaged in an activity that is experienced as interesting and satisfactory); 
however, he challenges Waterman et al.’s suggestion that eudaimonia is always accompanied 
by hedonia. Vittersø proposes that personal growth processes are often unrelated to, and 
sometimes even negatively associated with, pleasant feeling states and overall life satisfaction. 
Further, Vittersø suggests that pleasure and satisfaction do not motivate effortful behaviour, 
but are more likely to occur subsequent to effortful behaviour. The crux of Vittersø’s argument 
is that personal growth (which he proposes as a eudaimonic outcome variable) is linked with 
the emotion of interest (which he considers the hallmark of a eudaimonic activity), whilst life 
satisfaction (a hedonic outcome variable) is linked with the emotion of pleasure (a hallmark of a 
hedonic behaviour activity). 
To test this, Vittersø and Søholt (2011) had Norwegian Folk High School students complete 
measures of life satisfaction, personal growth, and both state and trait measures of the 
emotions of interest (three items: engagement, interest, and enthusiasm) and pleasure (three 
items: contentment, enjoyment, and happiness). All measures were completed on two separate 
occasions four months apart, except for the state emotion measure which was only completed 
at time one in a retrospective manner, whereby participants were required to rate their 
experience of pleasure and interest during an outdoor experience that occurred three weeks 
prior. As hypothesised, life satisfaction was found to correlate only modestly with personal 
growth (r < 0.30). A strong correlation was observed between both personal growth and interest 
as a trait emotion, and between life satisfaction and pleasure as a trait emotion at both time one 
(T1) and time two (T2). Regression analyses were conducted with either pleasure or interest as 
the dependent variable, with life satisfaction being found to be the only significant predictor of 
pleasure, whilst personal growth was found to be the sole predictor of interest. Path models 
were also used to estimate the longitudinal relationship between life satisfaction, personal 
growth, pleasure, and interest, with life satisfaction (T1) being found to predict trait pleasure 
(T2), whilst trait interest (T1) was found to predict personal growth (T2). As pleasure is a 
defining aspect of hedonic behaviour and life satisfaction is typically considered a hedonic 
wellbeing indicator, whilst interest is a defining aspect of eudaimonic behaviour and personal 
growth a eudaimonic wellbeing indicator, Vittersø and Søholt interpreted the results as 
evidence of a distinction between hedonia and eudaimonia (both at the activity level and at the 
wellbeing level).  
Vittersø and Søholt’s (2011) findings contest Waterman et al.’s (2008) proposition that 
hedonic pleasures are always present during eudaimonic pursuits, and instead suggest that 
eudaimonic pursuits are often characterised by the emotional states of interest and 
engagement. Despite this, Vittersø and Søholt operationalized hedonic and eudaimonic 
activities differently to Waterman et al., which means direct comparisons between their 
findings cannot be made. Vittersø and Søholt’s study also had the inherent risk of recall error 
like Waterman et al.’s, as participants were required to retrospectively reflect on how they felt 
at an earlier period. However, in Vittersø and Søholt’s study they were reflecting on a specific 
instance of activity engagement, which somewhat reduces the risk of recall error. The highly 
unique sample utilised (i.e. high school students at a school specialising in outdoor education) 
in Vittersø and Søholt’s study also limits the generalizability of their findings.  
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Delle Fave et al. (2011a) have also recently investigated hedonia and eudaimonia utilising a 
unique mixed method approach, containing both qualitative and quantitative methods. They 
aimed to evaluate whether the philosophical traditions of hedonia and eudaimonia were 
consistent with what lay people refer to when they speak of wellbeing and happiness. They 
were also interested in sampling a different population to what had been utilised in the 
majority of past wellbeing research (i.e. university undergraduate students). A purposefully 
selected sample from seven different countries (Australia, Croatia, Germany, Italy, Portugal, 
Spain, and South Africa) included males and females living in urban areas, aged between 30 
and 51. Delle Fave et al. were interested in mature people who were passing or had passed 
through some of the major life stages (e.g. formal education, settled into career, marriage and 
child bearing), as they believed that such individuals had a greater repertoire of experiences on 
which to evaluate their happiness and meaningfulness. Participants were asked open-ended 
questions, requiring them to define what happiness meant to them and what things they found 
meaningful. They were then required to rate on two 7-point scales the degree of happiness and 
meaningfulness they associated with 11 different life domains (i.e. Work, Family, Standard of 
Living, Interpersonal Relationships, Health, Personal Growth, Spirituality/Religion, Society 
issues, Community issues, Leisure, and Life in general). Participants also completed the 
Satisfaction with Life Scale (Diener, Emmons, Larsen, & Griffin, 1985).  
Participants were found typically to define happiness in terms of both the contents of 
happiness (internal dimensions) and the related contexts (situational dimensions). Contextual 
definitions referred to the life domains participants associated with happiness. Relational 
aspects were most prominent, with family and social relations accounting for over half the 
answers, whilst the domain of health followed as the third-ranked domain. These findings 
suggest that happiness stems predominantly from interpersonal bonds, mainly intimate 
relationships (with a partner and children in particular) but also from interactions with friends 
and significant others outside the family. The preponderance of references to relationships 
suggests that wellbeing has a relational core, which was unsurprising to Delle Fave et al. 
(2011a), as conceptualisations of wellbeing often emphasise the importance of social 
connectedness (e.g. Keyes, 2007; Ryff & Keyes, 1995; Seligman, 2011). Answers referring to 
content emphasised the psychological structure and characteristics of happiness. Both hedonic 
and eudaimonic aspects were referred to, with eudaimonic components being more prominent 
in participants’ answers. The most frequently cited content of happiness was harmony and 
balance (e.g. inner peace, self-acceptance, serenity, and a feeling of balance and evenness), with 
over 25% of participants’ answers referring to this. Other components that have typically been 
considered eudaimonic included meaning, engagement, fulfilment, awareness, autonomy, 
achievement and optimism. When grouped together, eudaimonic references accounted for 
38.9% of participants' definitions of happiness. Hedonic aspects referred to included positive 
feelings/emotions and satisfaction, which were cited in 23.8% of the answers. As with contexts, 
the contents of happiness referred to by participants were consistent with many previous 
wellbeing conceptualisations (e.g. Ryan & Deci, 2000; Ryff & Keyes, 1995). These results, from 
qualitative research, suggest that the lay-person’s perspectives of happiness and wellbeing are 
relatively consistent with the hedonic and eudaimonic traditions. Further, as participants 
defined happiness in terms of its contents and associated contexts, future wellbeing 
conceptualisations may benefit from adopting such a categorical system. 
Quantitative findings basically confirmed qualitative results, with the domain of family 
being ranked highest in terms of its association with both happiness and meaningfulness, 
whilst the domains of health and interpersonal relations followed. Although ratings of 
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meaningfulness and happiness were mostly congruent (i.e. domains associated with 
meaningfulness were generally also associated with happiness), some incongruences were 
observed, the most notable of which were within the work domain. Whilst work was associated 
with a high degree of meaningfulness, it was ranked near the bottom in terms of happiness. 
This finding contrasts with the position of Waterman et al. (2008), and suggests that meaning 
can be perceived and pursued in the absence of hedonic happiness. Again however, Delle Fave 
et al. (2011a) operationalized eudaimonia differently to Waterman et al., which restricts the 
possibility of drawing direct comparisons. Surprisingly, happiness and meaningfulness ratings 
explained only 38% of the variance in life satisfaction, which suggests that 62% of life 
satisfaction is explained by other factors. Delle Fave et al. wondered if the difference in global 
and domain specific judgments may explain this finding, because when making global 
judgments people rely on multiple sources, and these sources are weighted differently (i.e. 
global judgments are generally not equal to the sum of domain specific judgments). Delle Fave 
et al. further pondered whether perhaps ratings of happiness and meaningfulness have 
participants reflect on more eudaimonic factors (as suggested by the qualitative responses), 
whilst ratings of life satisfaction have participants reflect on hedonic factors (e.g. desire 
satisfactions). As highlighted through the review of Waterman and colleagues (Waterman, 
1993; Waterman et al., 2008) and Vittersø and Søholt’s (2011) research, hedonia and eudaimonia 
show a positive relationship, but are distinct and independent constructs.  
Delle Fave et al.’s (2011a) research suggests that wellbeing is a multifaceted concept, and 
considering this, they strongly argued against unified wellbeing models which disregard the 
differences between eudaimonic and hedonic aspects. Ratings of happiness, meaningfulness 
and life satisfaction varied, in that participants perceived their lives as predominantly 
meaningful and happy, but as satisfying to a lesser extent. This emphasises the need for jointly 
evaluating different aspects of wellbeing, and for giving proper relevance to the eudaimonic 
dimensions. Delle Fave et al. also found that a relatively overlooked dimension of wellbeing, 
namely harmony/balance, constitutes an important aspect of lay people’s conceptions of 
happiness. This suggests that the commonly held assumptions that more is better may be 
misleading in terms of happiness and wellbeing, and that perhaps achieving a balance between 
different needs, commitments and aspirations is more important. Further research is necessary 
to better disentangle the wellbeing dimension of harmony and balance. 
Whilst there were many strengths to Delle Fave et al.’s (2011a) investigation (e.g. mixed 
method approach, culturally diverse sample, etc.), this research was not without limitations. 
Firstly, whilst the purposeful selection of the sample in relation to demographics represents a 
less-investigated population, it does mean that conclusions cannot be generalised outside of 
this narrow range. Therefore, the plausible hypothesis that the relative importance of hedonia 
and eudaimonia changes across the life span remains unaddressed. It should also be noted that 
Delle Fave et al. developed single-item measures of meaning and happiness, which questions 
the validity and reliability of findings. Future research should therefore attempt to utilise 
standardised measures of these constructs to more rigorously investigate the constructs of 
hedonia and eudaimonia. Further, it was unclear from Delle Fave et al.’s procedure section how 
participants were asked to rate the domains in terms of meaningfulness and happiness. The 
way participants were asked to rate the domains greatly affects how results should be 
interpreted. For example, if participants were asked how meaningful a domain was to them, 
that would be a question about how much they value that domain; however, if they were asked 
the extent to which they experience a sense of meaning whilst engaged in activities associated 
with a certain domain, that would be a question about momentary eudaimonia, consistent with 
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the way Waterman (1993) conceptualised eudaimonia. Clearly detailing key methodology such 
as this is critical for assisting with interpretation and replication.    
Together, Waterman (1993), Waterman et al.’s (2008), Vittersø and Søholt’s (2011), and Delle 
Fave et al.’s (2011a) research provides a strong argument that hedonia and eudaimonia are 
distinct, but highly related. Whilst Waterman proposed that eudaimonic pursuits are invariably 
accompanied by hedonia, Vittersø and Søholt and Delle Fave et al. suggest that eudaimonia is 
not always accompanied by hedonic enjoyment or pleasure. Vittersø and Søholt’s and Delle 
Fave et al.’s research further suggest that hedonia and eudaimonia are distinguishable at the 
wellbeing level. With a predominantly conceptual and theoretical focus, this research offers 
little insight into the broader wellbeing outcomes associated with hedonic and eudaimonic 
pursuits. Therefore, research investigating eudaimonic and hedonic pathways to wellbeing will 
now be reviewed.  
 
3.2 Pathways to wellbeing 
Peterson, Park and Seligman (2005) were the first to utilise an integrated methodology in the 
investigation of pathways to wellbeing. The crux of this pioneering research was the 
Orientations to Happiness (OTH) scale. This questionnaire requires individuals to rate whether 
they typically approach life in search of meaning, pleasure, and/or engagement – these three 
orientations are not considered mutually exclusive (i.e. an individual can simultaneously be 
high on all three). This scale reflects Seligman et al.’s (2004) Authentic Happiness theory, with 
two of the orientations, the pleasant life and the meaningful life, being equated with hedonia 
and eudaimonia respectively, whilst the engaged life has been equated with flow (Park, 
Peterson, & Ruch, 2009). Peterson et al. (2005) found that all three orientations were predictive 
of life satisfaction, thereby supporting the notion that either hedonic or eudaimonic pathways 
can lead to wellbeing when pursued in isolation. Despite this, results suggested that an 
orientation toward meaning and engagement were more robust predictors of life satisfaction 
relative to pleasure. It was further found that the simultaneous pursuit of all three orientations, 
termed the full life, was associated with the highest degree of life satisfaction, suggesting that a 
life rich in both eudaimonic and hedonic pursuits is best. It is notable that this research has 
since been replicated with a variety of populations (e.g. students, teachers, the elderly) in over 
27 nations, with results confirming the strong relationship between the full life and life 
satisfaction (Chan, 2009; Chen, Tsai, & Chen, 2010; Park et al., 2009; Ruch, Harzer, Proyer, Park, 
& Peterson, 2010; Vella-Brodrick, Park, & Peterson, 2009).  
Despite Peterson et al.’s (2005) research resulting in the development of an integrated 
model pertaining to pathways to wellbeing (i.e. the full life model), the retrospective cross-
sectional data collection method, which in this instance required participants to reflect globally 
on how they typically live, may have been subject to recall error and social desirability bias. 
This method of questioning asks participants to make cognitive judgements about how they 
typically live; the assumption being that these judgements will be accurate representations of 
what participants actually do. The accuracy of such global cognitive judgements has been 
questioned (Gosling, John, Craik, & Robins, 1998), and provides limited information regarding 
how much the individual actually invests in a certain orientation. The OTH questionnaire may 
be more a measure of attitudes than of behaviour, and it is well established in the literature that 
attitudes can be a poor predictor of actual behaviour (Ajzen & Fishbein, 2005). Therefore, it is 
not discernible from Peterson et al.’s research whether behaving in hedonic and/or eudaimonic 
ways is associated with life satisfaction, or whether holding hedonic and/or eudaimonic 
attitudes is.  
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Peterson et al.’s (2005) findings that the orientations of engagement and meaning were 
better predictors of life satisfaction than pleasure runs counter to Vittersø and Søholt’s (2011) 
findings, which suggested that pleasure was a stronger predictor of life satisfaction than 
engagement and interest. In explanation of this inconsistency, Vittersø and Søholt questioned 
the validity of the OTH scale, proposing that the orientations were not accurate measures of 
hedonia and eudaimonia. They cited research showing the pleasure orientation was found to 
correlate only weakly with other measures of pleasure, and the engagement orientation was 
found to be uncorrelated with measures of state engagement (Vittersø, Dyrdal, & Røysamb, 
2006). Inherent within the OTH scale appears to be a high risk of social desirability bias, as 
questions pertaining to the pleasure orientation seem to reflect impulsiveness (e.g. ‚life is too 
short to postpone the pleasures it can provide‛ and ‚I agree with this statement: life is short – 
eat dessert first") and appear considerably less desirable than all questions pertaining to both 
the meaning orientation (e.g. ‚my life serves a higher purpose‛ and ‚in choosing what to do, I 
always take into account whether it will benefit other people‛) and the engagement orientation 
(e.g. ‚I seek out situations that challenge my skills and abilities‛ and ‚I am rarely distracted by 
what is going on around me‛). This may have contributed to validity issues, as perhaps the 
pleasure orientation is more reflective of hedonism (i.e. the pursuit of pleasure as the ultimate 
good), rather than hedonia (the experience of happiness or pleasure). In any case, further 
validation is necessary before definitive conclusions can be made based on results from 
research utilising the OTH scale. A final limitation of Peterson et al.’s research is that life 
satisfaction was the only outcome measure utilized, thereby limiting possible conclusions 
regarding the effect of hedonia and eudaimonia on flourishing (i.e. on other dimensions of 
wellbeing). If multiple facets of wellbeing were measured – both hedonic and eudaimonic – it 
would be possible to delineate which orientation was associated with benefits in specific 
wellbeing dimensions. 
To rectify the limitation of using only life satisfaction as an outcome measure, Schueller and 
Seligman (2010) replicated Peterson et al.’s (2005) study with a sample of 13,565 participants 
and the addition of multiple outcome measures. Added scales included measures of 
momentary positive and negative affect, measures of more general/average levels of happiness, 
and the Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale (CES-D). Schueller and Seligman 
also included measures of educational and occupational achievements, which they claimed to 
be ‚objective‛ measures of wellbeing. The inclusion of the CES-D in this research represents a 
step in the right direction as it allows for observations to be made about the relationship 
between hedonia and eudaimonia and psychological distress. Not only is this reflective of the 
original goal of the positive psychology movement (i.e. to have a psychology that considers 
both the negative and positive aspects of the human experience; see Linley et al., 2006), but it is 
also especially relevant to any interventions that have been developed (e.g. positive 
psychotherapy), or will be developed based on hedonic and eudaimonic research findings. 
Positive psychotherapy was born out of Peterson et al.’s findings. Positive psychotherapy 
assesses clients for deficits in any of the three pathways and clients are encouraged to cultivate 
these areas (Seligman, Rashid, & Parks, 2006). This technique has been used as a treatment for 
depression, despite no empirical association yet being established between the empty life and 
depression, or the full life and an absence of depression. Although this seems to have occurred 
in the wrong direction (i.e. the intervention has been developed and utilised before the 
establishment of empirical associations between depression and the three orientations), the 
continued inclusion of measures of psychological distress in future investigations of 
eudaimonia and hedonia is of vital importance.  
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Schueller and Seligman’s (2010) findings were consistent with previous research utilising 
the OTH scale, whereby all three pathways were found to individually correlate with life 
satisfaction. This finding was also observed across other measures, with all three pathways 
correlating positively with positive wellbeing measures (i.e. subjective happiness scale, positive 
affect on the PANAS, the Fordyce Emotions Questionnaire, the Authentic Happiness 
Inventory) and negatively with negative wellbeing measures (i.e. negative affect and CES-D). 
Also consistent with previous findings was that the orientations of engagement and meaning 
were found to showed stronger associations with all outcome measures than was the pleasure 
orientation. Through confirmatory factor analysis, Schueller and Seligman also discovered that 
the three pathways were reliably distinguishable, but that engagement and meaning had the 
most significant overlap. This finding lends further credence to Waterman’s (1993), Vittersø 
and Søholt’s (2011), and Delle Fave et al.’s (2011a) suggestion that hedonia and eudaimonia are 
distinct, whilst the stronger association observed between engagement and meaning is 
consistent with previously proposed theoretical and empirical linkages between flow and 
eudaimonia (Waterman, 1993). 
Surprisingly, the pleasure orientation was less strongly associated with positive affect and 
happiness than the engagement and meaning orientation. Furthermore, the pleasure 
orientation was found to be negatively associated with educational and occupational 
achievement, whilst the engagement and meaning orientations were both positively associated 
with these outcomes. Schueller and Seligman proposed that Fredrickson’s (2004) broaden-and-
build theory of positive emotions might provide an explanation for these findings. The 
broaden-and-build theory suggests that resources and positive emotions relate to each other in 
a positive feedback loop, with increases in one leading to subsequent increases in the other. 
Engagement was argued to result in people seeking out activities that challenge their skills, 
which helps them develop their talents and interests; whilst meaning was argued to help build 
social connections and provides purpose, which leads to the development of self-relevant goals. 
In contrast, the pursuit of pleasure was argued to often not lead to the development of any 
durable resources, as such pursuits provide only momentary short-lived improvements in 
mood. Therefore, Schueller and Seligman argued that as the orientations of engagement and 
meaning are more conducive to the development of sustainable and rewarding resources than 
a pleasure orientation, it is understandable that those orientations were found to be more 
strongly associated with the experience of positive emotions and happiness and with 
educational and occupational achievements.  
Adding further support for the full life model was the finding that high scores on all three 
orientations were associated with the greatest life satisfaction, positive affect, and general 
happiness, and that this effect was more than an additive combination of each pathway. This 
finding suggests that although the orientations of engagement and meaning may be more 
related to higher levels of wellbeing than the orientation of pleasure, a total absence of the 
pleasure orientation is detrimental to wellbeing. Whilst the combined pursuit of all pathways 
was strongly associated with wellbeing benefits, it was not found to be predictive of lower 
levels of negative affect or depression. Schueller and Seligman (2010) argued that this was 
unsurprising, as the three pathways are considered approaches to happiness and not 
approaches to reducing negative emotions and psychopathology. This statement came as some 
surprise, as Seligman has been highly involved in the development and promotion of positive 
psychotherapy, which suggests that depression can be treated through the pursuit of the three 
orientations. In contradiction to this, Schueller and Seligman argued that whilst seeking 
pleasure, engagement, and meaning may be important to increase wellbeing, it may not 
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necessarily be helpful for alleviating distress. From this research, Schueller and Seligman 
concluded that pleasure, engagement, and meaning are all pathways to wellbeing, but they do 
not contribute equally to wellbeing. As engagement and meaning are associated with the 
development of resources and the pursuit of long-term goals, it was argued that they are the 
pathways that are more conducive to long-term wellbeing benefits. 
Schueller and Seligman’s (2010) investigation makes a significant additional contribution to 
previous findings by elucidating the three pathways relationship with multiple outcome 
measures. The finding that the combined pursuit of all three pathways was most beneficial in 
all outcome measures also lends further credence to the full life model, and again suggests that 
a life rich in both hedonic and eudaimonic pursuits may be associated with flourishing. Despite 
this, Schueller and Seligman, like Waterman et al. (2008), argue that eudaimonic pursuits are 
better than hedonic pursuits at promoting long-term wellbeing. We see a risk in proclaiming 
one pathway as better, or more rewarding, than another in these early stages of enquiry. From 
the limited data obtained from cross-sectional research it seems premature to be making such 
claims, especially considering that such conclusions may be interpreted as cautions against 
hedonia. Furthermore, the same limitations mentioned above regarding the validity of the OTH 
scale apply here, and perhaps the finding that the pleasure orientation had weaker associations 
with positive affect and happiness than the engagement and meaning orientations further 
questions the validity of the OTH. Furthermore, rather than strengthening this investigation, 
we believe the addition of the ‚objective‛ wellbeing measures of educational and occupational 
achievement was a weakness of the investigation. Whilst we recognise the inherent value of 
both education and occupation, it was the way these were operationalized that we disagree 
with. Firstly, it was admitted that the sample was extremely biased in terms of education, with 
89% having attended college, and 31% having completed post-college education. With such a 
homogeneous sample the value of including education as an outcome measure is questionable. 
Furthermore, only formal education (i.e. high school, college, and post-college) was 
acknowledged, with other types of education (e.g. self-directed learning) not recognised. In 
terms of occupational achievement, the researchers ranked occupations based on the ‚skill 
level‛ of the profession, with the highest-ranked jobs being professionals such as chief 
executives, doctors, lawyers, dentists, and professors. We question the value in this categorical 
system, as surely job satisfaction or performance would be a more useful outcome measure 
than an arbitrary ranking system based on ‚skill level‛. We would argue that to be good in any 
job requires a high level of specialised skill in that field. We see a ranking system based on 
income or societal perspectives of what constitutes a ‚good‛ job (which appears to be what was 
done in this case) as more damaging than helpful to the science of wellbeing.  
Steger et al. (2008) rectified many of the limitations associated with the data collection 
method in studies utilising the OTH scale by having participants reflect on specific instances of 
hedonic or eudaimonic behaviour. Despite concordantly investigating eudaimonia and 
hedonia, Steger et al. treated hedonia and eudaimonia as mutually exclusive, in that pursuits 
were considered to be either one or the other. Steger et al. conducted two daily diary studies, 
ranging from three weeks (Study 1) to four weeks (Study 2), in which participants were 
required to report how frequently they engaged in eudaimonic and hedonic behaviours each 
day. Study 1 had participants report the frequency of engagement in 14 activities (seven 
hedonic and seven eudaimonic), which were considered by a group of five individuals who 
had experience in philosophy and psychology to be representative of prototypically 
eudaimonic and hedonic pursuits. Participants also completed wellbeing questionnaires 
assessing life satisfaction, positive and negative affect, and meaning in life. The eudaimonic 
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behaviours were found to be more frequently engaged in (ratio of 3.5:1) than the hedonic 
behaviours and were also more strongly associated with wellbeing than hedonic behaviours in 
all wellbeing dimensions. Furthermore, eudaimonic behaviours were found to lead to more 
meaning in life and life satisfaction the following day. 
Considering the higher frequency of reported eudaimonic behaviours, and out of concern 
that the seven original hedonic behaviours may have led to a socially desirable response bias 
towards eudaimonic behaviours, Steger et al. (2008) conducted study 2. They were concerned 
that perhaps the hedonic behaviours they included, or perhaps how the item responses were 
worded, may have led to the observed low frequency of reporting, and therefore they 
reworded three of the items (e.g. ‚had sex purely to get pleasure‛ was reworded ‚had sex with 
someone I do not love‛) and added five more hedonic behaviours they expected to be more 
frequently engaged in (e.g. ‚spent time listening to music‛). Furthermore, Steger et al. included 
a measure of social desirability in this study. Scores of this scale were found to be uncorrelated 
with aggregated totals of eudaimonic or hedonic behaviour reporting, which was interpreted as 
evidence that participants had not responded in a socially desirable manner. Other findings 
were consistent with study 1 in that eudaimonic behaviours had stronger associations with all 
wellbeing outcome measures than did hedonic behaviours.  
Despite Steger et al.’s (2008) findings suggesting that eudaimonic pathways may be a more 
effective way to attain personal wellbeing, a number of methodological flaws limit the validity 
of their findings and conclusions. Steger et al. were determined to investigate the relative 
contribution of eudaimonic and hedonic activities on wellbeing, and therefore included 
activities which they considered to be pure representations of each type of activity. We do not 
consider this a worthy line of investigation for two reasons. Firstly, the issue of context must 
again be highlighted. The relative contributions of hedonic and/or eudaimonic behaviours 
should be considered only in the context of an individual’s life as a whole. For example, an 
individual who lives a highly hedonic lifestyle may get wellbeing boosts from engaging in a 
eudaimonic activity, while a highly eudaimonic individual may need nothing more than a 
night of hedonic pleasures to boost their wellbeing. The frequency of only seven eudaimonic 
and seven hedonic activities (ten in the second study) were recorded, which provides limited 
information regarding what else the participants were doing, or the time period during which 
the individual may have engaged in a reported behaviour. A participant may have engaged in 
numerous hedonic or eudaimonic behaviours that were not represented on the list, or may 
have frequently reported engaging in an activity on the list, yet the time they spent engaged in 
this activity may have been insignificant. Second, we disagree with the assumption that the 
behaviours chosen by the researchers were exclusively eudaimonic or hedonic, or that any 
activity will be universally experienced as hedonic or eudaimonic. The experience of any given 
activity is highly subjective, and therefore it is the individual who should rate whether an 
activity was experienced as hedonic or eudaimonic. We would argue that many of the ‚purely 
hedonic‛ activities on the list could be considered highly eudaimonic (e.g. listing to music, 
going for a long walk, going to a concert, etc.), and vice versa. Further, it is questionable 
whether exclusively hedonic or eudaimonic behaviours even exist, especially considering the 
high degree of relatedness that has been observed between hedonia and eudaimonia (Vittersø 
& Søholt, 2011; Waterman et al., 2008)  
More recently, Huta and Ryan (2010) conducted an investigation into the effect of 
eudaimonic and hedonic motives on multiple facets of wellbeing. Both cross-sectional and 
experience sampling studies were conducted, utilising the Hedonic and Eudaimonic Motives 
for Activities scale, which requires participants to report their motives – either hedonic or 
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eudaimonic – for participation in an activity. They utilized an array of wellbeing outcome 
measures, including life satisfaction, positive and negative affect, carefreeness, meaning in life, 
vitality and elevating experiences (e.g. inspiration, deep appreciation, and self-transcendence). 
Principal component analyses confirmed that eudaimonic and hedonic motives were 
empirically distinct, and moderately related (r = 0.36). It was found that hedonic motives were 
related more strongly to positive affect than eudaimonic motives; however, eudaimonic 
motives were related to positive affect at 3-month follow-up. Hedonic motives were also found 
to be negatively related to negative affect, and showed an advantage over eudaimonic motives 
in this regard. Hedonic motives were found to be more strongly related to carefreeness, whilst 
eudaimonic motives were more strongly associated with meaning and elevating experiences. 
Eudaimonic and hedonic motives were equally associated with vitality and life satisfaction. 
Notwithstanding these more intricate findings, overall results indicated that people whose lives 
were high in both eudaimonic and hedonic motives had the highest degree of wellbeing as 
reflected in all dimensions (i.e. they were found to be flourishing), than predominantly 
eudaimonically motivated individuals, predominantly hedonically motivated individuals, and 
those whose lives were low in both motives. Huta and Ryan concluded that these findings lend 
further credence to the full life model of wellbeing proposed by Peterson et al (2005).  
Huta and Ryan’s (2010) study rectified several of the previously mentioned limitations of 
past research. The degree of eudaimonia and hedonia was rated by the participants and these 
were investigated in parallel terms, meaning any given motive for an activity could potentially 
be rated simultaneously high in eudaimonia and hedonia, or high in one or the other, or low in 
both. Furthermore, the inclusion of an array of wellbeing outcome measures meant that the 
relative association between eudaimonia, hedonia and the different facets of flourishing could 
be investigated. Finally, the experience-sampling method used by Huta and Ryan meant the 
risk of recall error and social desirability bias should have been reduced. Results suggested that 
hedonic motives are more closely associated with immediate emotional regulation, as 
evidenced by the strong positive association observed between hedonic motives and positive 
affect and carefreeness and the negative correlation observed between hedonic motives and 
negative affect. There also appeared to be a temporal sequence between eudaimonic motives 
and positive affect, whereby eudaimonia resulted in positive affect boosts down the track 
(perhaps when goals are achieved), which is consistent with Steger et al.’s (2008) and Vittersø 
and Søholt’s (2011) findings.  
Despite these methodological improvements, Huta and Ryan (2010) distinguished 
eudaimonic and hedonic motives for participating in an activity from the individual’s actual 
experience of the activity. It could be argued that the experience of an activity would have 
much more influence on one’s overall wellbeing than an individual’s intentions for engaging in 
an activity (Wirtz, Kruger, Napa Scollon, & Diener, 2003). It could be further argued that a 
person’s intentions for engaging in an activity may be unrelated or even negatively correlated 
with wellbeing. For example, one may engage in an activity with eudaimonic or hedonic 
motives only to be disappointed if the intended experience does not eventuate. Furthermore, 
although the experience-sampling method utilised does potentially minimise recall error and 
social desirability bias, it does not capture comprehensive behavioural information. It is 
possible that participants may be continuously paged whilst engaged in insignificant activities, 
and not whilst engaged in significant activities. Again, like in Steger at al.’s (2008) and Peterson 
et al.’s (2005) studies, the specifics about how much an individual invests in either hedonic or 
eudaimonic pathways is not discernible from the data obtained.  
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In combination, past research using integrated methodologies suggests that hedonia and 
eudaimonia are distinct subjective states that are associated with distinct wellbeing outcomes. 
Hedonia at the activity level is characterised by experiences of pleasure and enjoyment, and has 
been strongly associated with experiences of satisfaction, positive affect and happiness at the 
wellbeing level. Eudaimonia at the activity level is characterised by feelings of authenticity, 
engagement, and interest and has been associated with experiences of meaning and purpose in 
life and personal growth at the wellbeing level. Associations have also been observed between 
eudaimonic motives and life satisfaction and positive affect, and a temporal sequence has been 
observed, whereby eudaimonic pursuits appear to lead to positive affective experiences later. 
These observations suggest that both hedonic and eudaimonic pathways are associated with 
wellbeing benefits when pursued in isolation. Despite this, some research (e.g. Peterson et al., 
2005; Steger et al., 2008; Schueller & Seligman, 2010) suggests that eudaimonic pathways are 
more robust predictors of wellbeing than hedonic pathways. However, the validity of such 
assertions is questionable due to methodological limitations. When considered together, rather 
than compared, a life that is rich in hedonic and eudaimonic pursuits – the full life – appears to 
most strongly predict flourishing; however, the limitations of past research means that 
definitive conclusions cannot yet be reached. Such limitations include data collection methods 
that are susceptible to both social desirability bias and recall error; erroneous assumptions that 
activities are objectively eudaimonic or hedonic or that pursuits must be exclusively 
eudaimonic or hedonic; homogenous and unrepresentative samples; and the limited inclusion 
of only a few wellbeing outcome dimensions. 
 
4. Directions for future research 
The issues listed at the end of the previous paragraph remain to be addressed by future 
research efforts to further progress this important area of enquiry. While research into hedonia 
and eudaimonia remains in its infancy, research must focus on confirming or contesting what 
has thus far been postulated, whilst also refining methodologies to reach more practically 
relevant conclusions. Currently, data suggest that if someone typically approaches life with, or 
has a high frequency of, randomized eudaimonic or hedonic motives, they will flourish; 
however, the practical utility of these assertions is questionable. Instructing someone to live a 
life high in both eudaimonic and hedonic motives is a somewhat ambiguous and equivocal 
instruction. Further, investigation into the practical details of the full life, such as whether a 
particular period of time spent engaged in eudaimonic or hedonic pursuits is associated with 
flourishing; the degree to which eudaimonic or hedonic components of activities are related to 
wellbeing; the relationship between hedonia and eudaimonia; and whether the relative need 
for hedonic or eudaimonic pursuits to optimize wellbeing differs across the life-span, remains 
essential. Addressing such pragmatic questions will not only be useful in further establishing 
the validity of the model, but will also be informative for beginning the important transition 
from explaining and describing to applying and prescribing. 
Considering that most past research has been cross-sectional and focused on subjective 
global self-perceptions, a research focus that includes a more complete behavioural analysis is 
now necessary. This type of data would be useful in further establishing the validity of the full 
life model, as behavioural data could be cross referenced with previously used measures (e.g. 
OTH scale) to test construct validity. As experience-sampling has already been used to obtain a 
limited randomized sample of behaviours, future investigations should aim to obtain more 
comprehensive behavioural reports of how individuals actually spend their time and how the 
way in which individuals spend their time relates to wellbeing. If an individual is reporting the 
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activities they have actually taken part in (rather than making an unspecified global assessment 
about how they typically live) and their experience of those activities (as either hedonic or 
eudaimonic), the risk of recall error would be greatly reduced. Combining time-use research 
methods, such as the day reconstruction method (Kahneman, Krueger, Schkade, Schwarz, & 
Stone, 2004), with hedonic and eudaimonic rating scales, such as the HEMA scale (Huta & 
Ryan, 2010), would make the collection of such data possible. Whilst this research methodology 
may potentially be onerous for participants, online data collection methods or mobile phone 
reporting could mitigate the burden. 
This type of data is what is necessary to address the issue of context, which has been 
alluded to throughout this article. It is the authors’ belief that we need to move away from 
asking questions about whether hedonic or eudaimonic pursuits are better at promoting 
wellbeing. This only encourages unhelpful dichotomous thinking, and ignores the fact that 
hedonic and eudaimonic pursuits both play important roles in the promotion of wellbeing. 
Rather than pitting hedonia and eudaimonia against each other, research should attempt to 
identify when a specific type of pursuit is indicated for the promotion of wellbeing. Like many 
aspects of life, it is likely that too much hedonia or eudaimonia will be detrimental to 
wellbeing, and that optimal experiences of wellbeing will be associated with striking a balance 
between the two. The use of the label ‚full life‛ connotes that more is better, which is unlikely 
to be the case. Perhaps the ‚balanced life‛ may be a more appropriate label (as was recently 
theoretically argued (see Sirgy & Wu, 2009)); however, further research is necessary to establish 
whether this is the case. If research finds that investing a certain amount of time in eudaimonic 
and hedonic pursuits is associated with flourishing, then a practical guideline could be 
established to help identify and rectify imbalances. Time-use research methods are what will 
ultimately shed more light on this matter.  
A further benefit of focussing on specific instances of hedonic and eudaimonic behaviour 
rather than global self-assessments is that behaviours are malleable and therefore amenable to 
change, making them a good target for intervention. Behavioural activation treatments, 
whereby an activity schedule is prescribed to a patient with depression, have been found to be 
highly effective treatments (Dimidjian et al., 2006). As treatments aimed at increasing the 
general level of activity have been successful for relieving depression, the identification of 
eudaimonic and hedonic patterns associated with flourishing could make for targeted and 
effective interventions to enhance wellbeing. Activating eudaimonic or hedonic behaviours 
may also assist in ameliorating symptoms of distress and/or psychopathology. Although 
Schueller and Seligman’s (2010) research suggests that the full life is not associated with 
decreased depression, we believe that it is premature to conclude that interventions aimed at 
promoting hedonic and eudaimonic activation and balance will not be effective in relieving 
psychological distress. Therefore, it is recommended that future investigations continue to 
include measures of psychopathology so that the relationship between distress and hedonia 
and eudaimonia can be further elucidated.   
The continued use of rating scales is also recommended to investigate how the intensity of 
the hedonic or eudaimonic components of an activity relates to wellbeing return (i.e. wellbeing 
benefits). It may be that engaging in mildly hedonic activity does not have the same wellbeing 
benefits as engaging in moderately or highly hedonic activity. By combining the intensity of a 
person’s hedonic or eudaimonic experience with the time they spent engaged in the respective 
pursuits, questions such as whether there is an interaction between the two or whether one 
mediates the other could be addressed. Perhaps engaging in one hour of mildly hedonic 
activity is only slightly beneficial to wellbeing but as the degree of hedonia increases, the 
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amount of time engaged in that activity may decrease whilst maintaining the same mild benefit 
to wellbeing.  
The relationship between hedonic and eudaimonic pursuits themselves, and how this 
relationship influences wellbeing, also requires further investigation. Whilst some research 
suggests that eudaimonic pursuits are always accompanied by hedonic pursuits (Waterman et 
al., 2008), other research suggests that eudaimonia can be experienced in the absence of hedonia 
(Delle Fave et al., 2011a; Vittersø & Søholt, 2011). Given such disagreement, further research is 
necessary to clarify that issue. The causal nature of this relationship also requires investigation. 
For instance, it has often been assumed that eudaimonic behaviours lead to hedonic enjoyment, 
yet the opposite has also been observed: hedonia has been shown to lead to eudaimonic 
outcomes (King et al., 2006), which suggests there may be a reciprocal relationship between 
hedonia and eudaimonia. Furthermore, although it is intuitively appealing to assume that those 
activities that are experienced as both hedonic and eudaimonic would be associated with the 
greatest wellbeing benefits, this requires empirical support. If this assumption is empirically 
confirmed, then ways of identifying the activities an individual may experience as both hedonic 
and eudaimonic will be a useful line of investigation.  
Lastly, past homogeneous samples means it is now necessary to incorporate an array of age 
groups and demographic factors to investigate whether the findings are consistent across a 
more diverse population. Furthermore, there is merit in the investigation of pathways to 
wellbeing across the lifespan, since the relative importance of hedonic and eudaimonic pursuits 
may vary at different stages of life. It has been found that peoples’ conceptions of wellbeing 
change with age, and that although good relationships and the pursuit of enjoyable activities 
are consistently endorsed as important components of wellbeing across the lifespan, younger 
adults have a greater focus on self-knowledge, competence, and self-acceptance, while older 
adults focus more on positively coping with change (Carstensen, 1998; Erikson & Erikson, 1997; 
Ryff, 1989). Considering these differences in the desires and needs associated with wellbeing, it 
is intuitive to think that younger and older adults would have differing pathways to 
flourishing. Comparing the activity profile of stratified age ranges could help elucidate the 
differing needs of adults in relation to eudaimonic and hedonic activities. 
 
5. Conclusion 
The hedonic and eudaimonic perspectives both contribute to a comprehensive understanding 
of wellbeing, and should therefore be integrated. Findings from the limited research that has 
simultaneously investigated hedonia and eudaimonia suggests that they are distinct but highly 
related subjective experiences, and that both hedonic and eudaimonic pursuits can lead to 
wellbeing benefits; however it is also suggested that eudaimonic pursuits are associated with 
greater wellbeing benefits than are hedonic pursuits, and that a life rich in both hedonic and 
eudaimonic pursuits is associated with the greatest degree of wellbeing benefits. Despite this, 
significant research limitations require rectification in order to establish the validity and 
accuracy of such conclusions. Future research endeavours should abandon the past tendency to 
compare and contrast hedonia and eudaimonia so as to establish which is better. Instead the 
inherent value of both hedonia and eudaimonia should be recognised and attempts should be 
made to investigate more comprehensively how these operate in the overall context of an 
individual’s life. Future methodologies should move away from cross-sectional designs 
assessing global cognitive self-perceptions and instead should attempt to capture more 
accurately and comprehensively how participants actually live their lives (hedonically and/or 
eudaimonically) and how this relates to their wellbeing. Findings from such research could not 
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only add construct validity to previous research, but would also make it possible to transition 
from purely descriptive conclusions to more applied and practically relevant conclusions, 
which could be informative in the development of interventions potentially useful for both the 
enhancement of wellbeing and the reduction of distress.  
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